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Cannibalization can be simply defined as the removal of
a component from one aircraft for use in restoring another
aircraft to a flyable status. For example, if aircraft
number one is not ready for flight because it needs a
replacement radio and aircraft number two has a functioning
radio, then cannibalization is merely removing the radio
from the second aircraft and installing it in the first.
On 29 August 1978 the Chief of Naval Operations directed
all aircraft squadrons to reduce their level of cannibaliza-
tion by 20 percent. In this connection, the Chief of Naval
Operations expressed great concern over the wasted aircraft
maintenance manhours that were taking place every time a
maintenance technician cannibalized a needed component £~1.J.
These wasted manhours amounted to double work in that
every time cannibalization takes place two component removals
and two component installation are necessary. At the time
of this direction by the Chief of Naval Operations, as
well as since that time, the F-14A and S-3A aircraft have
had the highest levels of cannibalization ever achieved by
any naval aircraft. No matter what cannibalization measure-
ment methodology is used, the F-l^A and S-3A aircraft are
number one and number two navywide . In fact, the F-14A
10

and S-3A aircraft are cannibalized at twice the overall navy-
wide canni"balization rate. Because of this they were chosen
to "be the subjects of this canni~balization study.
B. THESIS OBJECTIVE
This thesis has four major objectives as they relate
to the Chief of Naval Operations goal of reducing cannibali-
z at ion. They are:
1. To research cannibalization measurement methodology.
Since reducing cannibalization by 20 percent is the major
objective of the Chief of Naval Operations, any study of
cannibalization would "be incomplete if it did not include
an indepth analysis of how cannibalization is or can be
measured.
2. To research why squadrons cannibalize. By knowing
why aircraft squadrons cannibalize, major policy makers
should be better able to assist squadrons in cannibalization
reduction.
3. To present a comparison of cannibalization in the
Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. By knowing how to measure
cannibalization and why squadrons cannibalize, the Chief
of Naval Operations can establish a baseline to compare the
present levels of cannibalization to future levels. Since
the Commander Naval Air Forces U.S. Atlantic Fleet and
the Commander Naval Air Forces U.S. Pacific Fleet are
responsible for cannibalization reduction and monitoring
11

in their respective fleets, a study of cannibalization
would "be incomplete without a comparison "between the two.
4. To determine if canni"balization is an evil or a
via"ble logistic alternative. The Chief of Naval Operations,
in his direction to the fleet, has "branded cannibalization
as "an evil maintenance practice that wasted valuable
manpower" and he wants cannibalization reduced 20 percent
from its present level. To understand the impact of this
goal, the present level of cannibalization should "be identified
as well as the related costs to the Navy. Then the question
of cannibalization as a cost-effective alternative to proper
logistic support needs to "be addressed.
C . METHODOLOGY
Throughout this thesis the reader should keep in mind
that any analysis methodology chosen on any subject is
largely dependent upon the situation the author is trying
to portray. Policy makers, as well as thesis authors, will
choose the methodology that "best supports their point of
view. For this reason many different methodologies will
"be used throughout this thesis in an effort to minimize
individual prejudices.
In an effort to find out how "best to measure cannibali-
zation and why cannibalization takes place, least squares
regression analysis was performed throughout this thesis.
Regression analysis was performed using the general equation
for a straight line namely, Y = B + MX, where Y is the
12

dependent variable and X is the independent variable. The
parameter 'B' represents the Y- Intercept and 'M* is the
slope of the line.
For each regression analysis performed, a coefficient
p
of determination (r ) was calculated, along with a t-statistic
and a regression equation.
The student-t distribution was utilized to establish
confidence levels for the slope coefficient where a t-statistic
of greater than + 2.228 is significant at the 95$ confidence
level. The effects of _autocorrelation on the regression
analysis were discounted for one primary reason.
There is no reason to suspect that if one month's
cannibalization activity is above average that there will be
a tendency for the next months cannibalization activity to
be either above or below the average. Expressed another
way, cannibalization during a given month should not be
influenced by how much cannibalization took place the pre-
ceding month
o
The following three primary sources of data were relied
upon:
1. Aviation 3-M data base. The Naval Aviation Main-
tenance Support Office (NAMSO) keeps a complete data base
on all naval aircraft. This data base contains documenta-
tion of every maintenance action on every aircraft in the
U.S. Navy inventory Z"~2,3_7. Throughout this thesis, data




2. Navy directives and instructions. The daily operations
of aircraft squadrons are governed by instructions and
directives issued by a wide range of Navy commands. These
directives and instructions establish the policies and pro-
cedures which all operating aircraft squadrons must follow.
3. Interviews. Since policies and directives are
subject to interpretation by those who implement them,
interviews were held with squadron, functional wing, and type
commander personnel.
D . ORGANIZATION
Chapter II of this thesis deals with the many different
cannibalization measurement methodologies. Chapter III
is concerned with why aircraft squadrons cannibalize. Chapter
IV presents a comparison study between NAL and NAP. Chapter
V deals with the question of cannibalization as an evil




II. CANNIBALIZATION MEASUREMENT METHODOLOGY
A. INTRODUCTION
Thus far, what canni"balization is and who the major
cannibalization policy makers are has been presented . In
this chapter, the different methodologies for measuring
cannibalization and which methodologies have been used
historically as a yardstick for cannibalization activity will
be explored. As was mentioned earlier, it is important to
understand that any measurement methodology chosen on any
subject matter is largely dependent upon what type of environ-
ment the analyst or policy maker is trying to portray. For
this reason, measurement methodologies will be divided into
two major groups. In the first group explored, only those
methodologies directed by the Chief of Naval Operations and,
as a consequence, by the major type commanders will be pre-
sented. The second group of methodologies presented will
be alternatives to the first group.
B. MEASUREMENT METHODOLOGIES DIRECTED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY
The Chief of Naval Operations £~lj and both major type
commanders have directed all squadron commanding officers
to measure cannibalization activity in terms of cannibaliza-
tion removals per 100 flight hours and cannibalization
removals to total maintenance removals.
15

1. Cannibalization Removals Per 100 Flight Hours
Taking the number of cannibalization removals in
an aircraft squadron per month and dividing it "by the number
of flight hours and then multiplying by 100 gives a ratio
of cannibalization removals per 100 flight hours. Figures
1 and 2 display navywide F-14A and S-3A cannibalization
activity in this manner.
Intuitively, this measure seems to be as good as
any, but leaves the maintenance manager with a very important
question to answer in using this measure: Is there a rela-
tionship or correlation between flight hours and cannibalization?
If there is a relationship or correlation between
canni"balization removals and flight hours, a simple least
sqaures regression analysis should provide a large coefficient
of determination. Further, if a large coefficient of deter-
mination is provided in combination with a t-statistic that
falls significantly outside the 95% confidence interval for
testing the null hypothesis that the slope of the regression
line (M) is equal to zero, then a significant relationship
or correlation can "be assumed. If this is the case, a
regression line based on cannibalization removals per flight
hour would be an extremely valuable tool in predicting
cannibalization removals for different flight hour scenarios.
However, great care must be taken when determining any cause
and effect relationship using regression analysis to insure
the two variables are causally related in the manner assumed
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In the case of cannibalization removals per flight
hour, a fairly strong relationship should exist. After all,
if aircraft are not flown then spare parts will not "be needed
and, if spare parts are not needed, then no canniDalization
of needed spare parts would take place
.
By using the general equation for a straight line,
Y = B + MX from Chapter I where Y corresponds to canniDali-
zation removals and X corresponds to flight hours. The
following regression results were obtained for the F-14A
and S-3A:
a. F-14 equation: Y = -273.22 + .4963X
p
Coefficient of Determination: r = .769
t-statistic: t = 5.76
b. S-3A Equation: Y = 56.59 + .364X
Coefficient of Determination: r = .824
t-statistic: t = 6.84
In the case of both the F-14A and S-3A aircraft,
the coefficients of determination indicate a fairly strong
relationship between cannibalization removals and flight
hours. This, in combination with t-statistics that are far
outside of the 95$ confidence acceptance region of +2.228,
makes flight hours an extremely valuable tool for predic-
ting cannibalization removals as operational tasking (flight
hours) varies. These relationships indicate that 76.9% of
the F-14A and 82.4% of the S-3A variance in cannibalization
removals each month is flight hour related, and indicates
19

a strong relationship "between cannibalization removals and
flight hours. Figures 3 and 4 plot the F-14A and S-3A
regression analysis data and the equations obtained.
By using a 100 flight hour base, these results say
that approximately 50 cannioalization occur for every 100
flight hours of the F-14A and 36 cannioalization occur
for every 100 flight hours of the S-3A.
2. Cannioalization Removals to Total Maintenance Removals
The second measurement methodology directed "by the
Chief of Naval Operations is cannioalization removals to total
maintenance removals. By taking the number of cannioalization
removals and dividing it by total maintenance removals, a ratio
is obtained. Figures 5 and 6 display F-14-A and S-3A canniba-
lization expressed as a ratio of cannibalization removals to
total maintenance removals over the time frame of this data.
A least squares regression analysis of cannibalization
removals, Y, to total maintenance removals, X, provides not
only an extremely large coefficient of determination for
the F-14A and S-3A aircraft, but also provides t-statistics
well outside the 95$ confidence level. Figures 7 and 8 plot
the F-14A and S-3A regression data. For the F-14A aircraft
the regression equation for cannibalization removals to
total maintenance removal was calculated to be Y = -379»6
+ .4064X, with a coefficient of determination of .949 and
a t-statistic of 13.64. The S-3A regression equation is
Y -61.47 + .383X, with a coefficient of determination of
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Thus we see that for the F-14A almost 41 out of 100
maintenance removals were canni"balization removals; for
the S-3A it was slightly more than 38 . The extremely high
correlation "between cann realization removals and total
removals makes this ratio an immensely valuable tool in
predicting variations in cannibalization activity.
As a footnote, a regression was made to determine
the correlation between total maintenance removals, Y, and
flight hours, X.
The F-14A aircraft provided an equation of Y = 496.82
+ .685X with a coefficient of determination of .866 and
t-statistic of 8.03. Likewise, the S-3A aircraft's equation
was calculated to "be Y = 52.90 + . 937X with a coefficient
of determination of .905 and a t-statistic of 9.76. This
data indicates that 68.5 maintenance removals were made per
100 flight hours of the F-14A and 93 maintenance removals
were made per 100 flight hours of the S-3A. As expected,
flight hours drives total maintenance removals of which
cannibalization removals are a subset.
C. ALTERNATIVE METHODOLOGIES
Both methodologies directed by higher authority are very
useful in the sense that cannibalization removals can he
predicted with fairly high accuracy for a given flight hour
figure, but more information is needed to provide a total
cannibalization picture. The real impact of cannibalization
on a squadron is on manpower in the total maintenance effort.
Therefore, methodologies relative to manpower are introduced
in this section. 27

1. Canni~balization Manhours to Total Maintenance Manhours
Cannibalization manhours are simply those manhours
expended "by a squadron cannibalizing components. Total
maintenance manhours represents all manhours expended doing
maintenance including those manhours spent cannibalizing.
CannilDalization manhours divided "by total maintenance
manhours gives the maintenance manager an indication of
the impact of cannibalization in the overall maintenance
effort. Figures 9 and 10 express this ratio for the P-14A
and S-3A aircraft over the time span of data. The yearly
mean ratio for the F-14A and S-3A aircraft was .048 and .058
respectively. This ratio on a yearly "basis tells major
policy makers that about five percent of the total maintenance
manhours expended in a year are cannibalization-related.
By using this ratio in conjunction with the yearly
cannibalization removals to total maintenance removals ratio,
the maintenance manager can get a "better picture of the impact
of cannibalization removals to the total maintenance effort.
For example, the F-14A aircraft averages 4.8 percent of
all maintenance manhours cannibalizing, but 33 percent of
all maintenance removals are cannibalization removals.
The maintenance manager must be very careful in
using this data in combination. Total maintenance man-
hours are made up of a combination of removals, scheduled
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A least squares regression analysis of canni"balization
manhours, Y, to total maintenance manhours, X, for the F-14A
aircraft navywide was calculated to "be Y = -915,5 + . 0538X,
with a coefficient of determination of .923 and a t-statistic
of 10.94-. The S-3A regression equation is Y = -7^7.7 + .0675X,
with a coefficient of determination of .880 and a t-statistic
of 8.56. Figures 11 and 12 display the F-14A and S-3A regres-
sion plot data. A "better measure would "be cannibalization
manhours to total removal manhours. Unfortunately, this
data is not available in the aviation 3-M data base. If it
were available, a much more realistic picture would be obtained
2. Cannibalization Removals Per Sortie
Measuring cannibalization actions in terms of flight
hours only masks a more important cause of equipment failures,
namely, the number of sorties. Ten one-hour flights produce
the same number of flight hours as one ten-hour flight.
However, an aircraft flying ten one-hour flights has ten
times as many shocks from take-offs and landings, as well
as ten times more starts and stops on the engine and avionics
components
.
By taking cannibalization removals and dividing it
by the number of sorties, a more significant ratio than
just flight hours is obtained. Figures 13 and 14 display
this methodology for the F-14A and S-3A aircraft.
A least squares regression analysis of the F-14A
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as Y and the number of sorties as X produces a regression
equation of Y = -528.97 + o3859X with a coefficient of
determination of .825 and a t-statistic of 6,87. The S-3A
aircraft provides a regression equation of Y = -76.88 +
1.08X with a .903 coefficient of determination and a t-statistic
of 9.64. Figures 15 and 16 display the P-14A and S-3A
regression data plot and regression lines.
Both coefficients of determination are larger than
the .769 and .824 obtained from the regression analysis of
cannibalization removals per flight hour. From this infor-
mation, the maintenance manager and policy makers can conclude
that, for the F-14 and S-3 aircraft the number of sorties is
a better explainer of the number of cannibalization than is
the number of flight hours
.
3 . Cannibalization Manhours Per Cannibalization Removal
The next measuremenx methodology to be explored is
cannibalization manhours per cannibalization removal.
Dividing cannibalization manhours by cannibalization removals
gives the maintenance manager and policy maker some insight
into how much manpower is needed for the average cannibali-
zation removal. Figures 17 and 18 illustrate its value
for the F-14A and S-3A aircraft.
This methodology should give the maintenance manager
a feel for what is being cannibalized rather than how much
cannibalization is taking place. A high manhour per canniba-
lization removal average could mean that the components being
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average. This average can tie used "by policy makers in
searching through the 3-M data case to see if there is one
particular system which is responsible for a sudden rise
or fall in the average
.
A regression analysis of cannibalization manhours, Y,
to cannibalization removals, X, for the F-14A aircraft
provided a regression equation of Y = 2025.4 + 3.30X, with
a coefficient of determination of .841 and a t-statistic
of 7.29. The S-3A aircraft produced a regression equation
of Y = -647.5 + 5.08X with a t-statistic of 5.29 and a coef-
ficient of determination of .737. Clearly, cannibalization
removals create cannibalization manhours. Figures 19 and
20 display the F-14A and S-3A regression data plot.
4. Cannibalization In Terms Of Equivalent Man-power
The total manhours available to a squadron are
relatively constant; what is done with those manhours is
not. What the policy maker needs to know is how many manyears
can be saved by not cannibalizing and what does that repre-
sent in terms of cost. By knowing this, the policy maker
can decide where best to commit resources to minimize the
impact of cannibalization and if more resources will be
expended than saved in reducing cannibalization
.
Aircraft squadron manning is based on aircraft con-
figuration, computed workload, specified operating profiles
and required operational capabilities. Manhours are based
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Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 5320. 170A. This means
each maintenance technician is expected to perform 252
hours of maintenance each month. By dividing canni"balization
manhours "by 252, equivalent man-months spent cannrealizing is
obtained. Figures 21 and 22 illustrate this methodology
for the F-14A and S-3A aircraft navywide
.
With this information, a policy maker now has a
figure that can easily "be converted into dollars. By
taking the average salary of a maintenance technician for
a year and multiplying it by the manyears expended, a
total dollar figure is obtained.
The F-14 aircraft squadrons, for example, expended
379-5 man*month3 navywide cannibalizing in a single year.
By dividing this figure by 12, the number of months in a
manyear, we obtain 31.62 equivalent manyears . Thus, navy-
wide, if F-14A cannibalization was reduced to zero, 31.62
manyears would be available for other maintenance. Dividing
31.62 by the number of F-14 squadrons, which is 16, provides
a value of 1.97 manyears per squadron.
If these 1.97 cannibalization manyears plus all
other maintenance manyears are less than the total available
manyears per squadron then no dollar savings can occur by a
reduction in cannibalization. If, however, this sum is
greater than available manyears to a squadron, some amount
of savings can occur by a reduction in cannibalization.
It is not at all apparent that the most cost-effective way
to do this is by reducing cannibalization. Other areas





































Ill- WHY DO SQUADRONS CANNIBALIZE ?
A. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, the reason why aircraft squadrons
cannibalize will "be examined. However, it is important to
remember that there are as many different reasons to canni-
balize as there are aircraft squadrons and maintenance
managers . Each squadron works in a different management
environment with different constraints as well as different
goals to fulfill. By understanding what cannibalization is
and why cannibalization takes place, we will be better able
to measure its overall impact on aviation squadrons.
B. SQUADRON CANNIBALIZATION
1. Material Shortages
The first and probably the most obvious reason for
squadron-level cannibalization is that a material shortage
exists and the local supply system simply does not have a
replacement asset. In this case, the squadron level main-
tenance manager has no choice but cannibalization if the
aircraft is to be restored to a mission capable status.
In the case of a material shortage of a replacement
asset that cannot be cannibalized (i.e., an o-ring seal
for a hydraulic cylinder), the maintenance manager's only
alternative is to wait for a replacement asset. However,
that aircraft then becomes available as a source for canni-
balization of other assets.
^7

Under the Naval Aviation Maintenance Program, supply
shortages are measured "by a not mission capable supply (NMCS)
rate expressed in terms of its percent impact on aircraft
readiness /"~4_J7. Aircraft readiness is obtained "by adding
all the hours in a month that an aircraft is ready for flight
(mission capable) and dividing those hours "by 720 hours,
the number of hours in a 30 day month. For example, if an
aircraft was mission capaole for 555 hours in a month, its
readiness would be 555 divided by 720 or 77 percent readiness.
Not mission capable supply is computed by summing all
the hours in a month an aircraft is not ready for flight
(not mission capable) due to material shortages and dividing
that value by 720 hours per 30 day month. For example, if
the sum of NMCS hours is 150 then the NMCS rate would be
150 divided by 720 or 20.8 percent NMCS.
If NMCS drives cannibalization then squadron level
cannibalization would be expected to vary as a function
of the NMCS rate. By performing a regression analysis of the
number of cannibalization removals, Y, as a function of the
NMCS rate, X, for the F-14A aircraft, the equation was
calculated to be Y = 594.5 + 53.18X with a coefficient of
determination of .048 and a t-statistic of .710. The S-3A
aircrafts equation was found to be Y = 1769.2 + -,17.33 X
with a coefficient of determination of .049 and a t-statistic
of .717. In both cases the t-statistic is well within the
95% confidence level of +2.228. This indicates that the
48

null hypothesis that the slope of the regression line is
equal to zero is not rejected. The very small coefficients
of determination confirms the conclusion that the NMCS rate
has little or no relationship to cannrealization removals.
Figures 23 and 24 display F-14A and S-3A cannibalization
removals to NMCS regression data plots.
Material shortages will drive an individual decision
to canni"balize, out do not support overall cannibalization
rates. Squadron level maintenance managers consolidate
unfilled supply requirements to as few aircraft as possible
in order to maximize readiness. One would assume this shift
to "be true since no one would cannibalize a part if a re-
placement asset was available. Without this part consolida-
tion, we might expect to see the NMCS rate become more
proportional to cannibalization activity.
This leads to the second reason for cannibalization,
that of having a supply asset, but not being able to issue
the asset to the squadron in the required time frame.
2. Supply Response Time
The aircraft carrier environment of today requires
aircraft maintenance managers to launch aircraft in a 20-30
minute time-window. From the time aircraft-recovery is
over until the time of the next launch of that aircraft is,
at most, 30 minutes. Because of this, a replacement component
that takes more than 30 minutes to deliver is of little use
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Even though a local supply activity could be 100 percent
effective in meeting the Chief of Naval Operations goal of
one hour supply response time, it may not even come close
to meeting the supported squadrons material needs
.
Many a maintenance manager has directed the cannibali-
zation of a component prior to even ordering a replacement
component simply "because the component was needed now and not
one hour from now.
3 . Readiness Reaching
Readiness is measured against a twenty-four hour
day and a thirty day month, or a total of 720 hours. Each
time the aircraft is not ready for flight (not mission capable),
the time it spends in a not ready status is subtracted from
720 hours to get actual ready time. The readiness measure is
a percentage figure which is obtained by summing all the
actual ready time and dividing it by 720 hours. The Chief
of Naval Operations has set a readiness goal for all squadrons
of 70 percent. Aircraft readiness is so important to the
Navy that it has become a determining factor in the career
success or failure of squadron commanding officers . Aircraft
can be not ready for flight for many reasons, most of which
are internal to the squadron, but it is much easier to blame
a supporting supply activity for lack of readiness than to
admit to the world that internal problems are the primary
reasons for not being ready.
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To achieve the 70 percent readiness goal, an aircraft
must "be mission capable for 504- hours each month. Now with
this goal in mind, readiness reaching as it applies to canniba-
lization and achieving 70 percent readiness can be explained.
The typical squadron maintenance crew while shore-
based works in two eight-hour shifts, five days a week (1/3
to 1/2 of all F-14A and S-3A squadrons operations are shore-
based at any given time). This means, little or no main-
tenance is performed on weekends. Assuming a four weekend
month, that means 192 hours of readiness time is accumulated
over the four weekends. In other words, 38 percent of the
504 hours required to meet Chief of Naval Operation standards
occurs during a time period in which no maintenance is per-
formed. Add to that the eight hours a day that are not
covered by a two-shift work force and the percentage is
increased to 73 percent of the 504 hours necessary to reach
CN0 standards.
These figures make it very profitable in terms of
readiness to cannibalize on Fridays and during the second
shift during the week even if the aircraft is not needed
for the next day's flight schedule. By cannibalizing from
other aircraft and consolidating material shortages, supply
response times and backorders are discounted. All that
needs to be done is order a part, then cannibalize. Why
wait on a system response or risk a not-in-stock situation
when the required readiness can be achieved through
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cannibalization. By picking and choosing cannibalization
time frames, readiness can be maximized at the expense
of a few extra manhours
.
This readiness reaching policy consolidates NMCS
requirements to the minimum number of aircraft, avoids
supply response delays, and maximizes readiness that can be
essential to the squadron commanding officer.
4. Operational Commitments
Many type commanders view operational commitments
as the only valid reason for cannibalization. After all,
if the aircraft is not needed to meet the flight schedule
why should we ask our maintenance technicians to expend
double maintenance manhours just to achieve readiness
.
This view says, "Cannibalize when operational commitments
require it and allow the supply system to react all other
times." The CNO also directs that operational commitments
are the only valid reason for cannibalization in his instruc-
tions to squadron commanding officers. Unfortunately, the
CNO still requires 70 percent readiness to be achieved.
Squadron commanding officers have so many number
one priorities that the best they can ever hope to do is
satisfice. Their rationale tends to be that if readiness
is 70 percent and all operational commitments are made and
squadron personnel are relatively happy, then no one would
ever argue with the amount of cannibalization activity.
This view is also supported by a promotion system that
emphasizes readiness rather than cannibalization activity.
5^

Operational commitments are measured in terms of
flight hours. This has led to measuring cannibalization
actions per flight hour. This measuring criteria was
discussed in detail in Chapter II.
5. Avoid The Risk Of A Stock Out Or Missed Sortie
The supply system goal as set out in the Naval
Aviation Maintenance Program is to deliver 90 percent of all
squadron issue-group-one demand in one hour. Issue-group-
one material is that material that makes an aircraft not
mission capable or reduced mission capable. This means
that, if a supporting supply activity is reaching the estab-
lished goal, ten percent of the time some period of greater
than one hour, and in some cases weeks, will be required to
deliver issue-group-one material.
In the case of the F-14A and S-3A, this 90 percent
goal has never been achieved navywide . The F-14A and S-3A
have averaged 80 percent and 73 percent, respectively, for
the last 12 months.
The maintenance manager's dilemma now becomes that of
risking ordering a part and waiting for it to be delivered,
while knowing that at least 20 percent of the time, and in
the case of the S-3, 27 percent of the time, the order will
not be filled, or cannibalize a sure thing and not miss a
scheduled flight. Many maintenance manager view cannibali-
zation as risk avoidance in its purest form.
55

6. Troubleshooting a Complex Aircraft
Very few, if any, maintenance managers would argue
against the statement that naval aircraft have "become more
and more complex with each generation. Training demands
on new maintenance technicians are far in excess of the
demands placed on past personnel.
To minimize the adverse impact on maintenance and
troubleshooting skills, modern aircraft such as the F-14A
and S-3A rely heavily on "built- in- test (BIT) features for
troubleshooting. BIT simply tells the maintenance man or woman
what is wrong with the system and which component or components
has failed. This system works well, most of the time, until
the BIT feature fails or a failure occurs that is outside
the monitoring capacity of BIT. In the latter case many
error-free components may be changed before a fault is
corrected.
The removal of error-free components by a squadron
level maintenance department is monitored by the supporting
intermediate maintenance activity. This monitoring takes
place so that intermediate maintenance managers can alert
squadron-level maintenance managers of BIT problems or
faulty training of maintenance troubleshooters.
Squadron-level maintenance managers and technicians
now become caught between a BIT system or troubleshooter
training system that has failed and an intermediate main-
tenance activity that monitors error- free component removal.
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To avoid this dilemma, the maintenance technician uses a
known good system from another aircraft to troubleshoot
the Dad system. Simply put, the maintenance manager directs
the cannibalization of a good aircraft to fault isolate
a "bad aircraft
.
This type of cannioalization hides poor trouble-
shooting performances from the intermediate maintenance
activity and perpetuates marginal BIT system features
.
By cannibalizing a good aircraft, to fault isolate a bad
aircraft, squadron level maintenance managers minimize their
error-free removal percentages at the cost of a few extra
manhours . If squadron level maintenance managers viewed
error-free reporting by the intermediate maintenance activity
as an indicator of a possible training or BIT system problems
rather than an indicator of their management ability, then
cannibalization for troubleshooting would be minimized.
7. Maintainability
In recent years the aircraft acquisition process has
learned from past mistakes and has made maintainability
a major design criterion for the acquisition of naval air-
craft. Maintainability is the ability to repair an aircraft
in a given time period assuming trained personnel and proper
replacement parts.
The F-14A and S-3A have relied heavily on maintain-
ability engineering from the very beginning of the acquisition
process. However, both aircraft have the highest cannibalization
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rates "by any methodology ever experienced "by naval aircraft
.
This canni"balization can, inpart "be attributed to having
an aircraft whose component parts can "be removed and replaced
so quickly (in most cases in less than 15 minutes elapsed
time) that waiting for a supply system to react to demand
does not seem to "be an alternative worth considering.
58

IV. CANNIBALIZATION ACTIVITY BY MAJOR FLEETS
FOR THE F-14A AND S-3A AIRCRAFT
A . INTRODUCTION
This chapter will consist of two major sections. The
first section will deal with F-14A and S-3A cannibalization
activity compared "between the Naval Air Forces U.S. Atlantic
Fleet (NAL) and the Naval Air Forces U.S. Pacific Fleet
(NAP). Both of the major type commanders of these forces
are responsible for the overall performance of all fleet
aircraft, fleet support aircraft and aircraft carriers in their
respective fleets. This comparison will "be done using the
measurement methodology described in Chapter II.
The second section of this chapter will interpret the
comparison data presented in the first section and explain
the significant disparities that exist between the two fleets
flying the same aircraft, in the same carrier environment,
operating under the same Naval Aviation Maintenance Program.
1. Cannibalization Removals Per 100 Flight Hours
In Chapter II it was shown that cannibalization
removals and flight hours had a definite relationship and
correlation for the F-14A and S-3A aircraft navywide; that
is, flight hours was shown to be a fairly strong predictor
of cannibalization removals with a coefficient of deter-
mination of .769 for the F-14A and .824- for the S-3A and
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with t-statistics well outside of the 95?° confidence region.
The data will now "be seperated into that associated with
NAL and with NAP.
Figures 25 and 26 display NAL and NAP cannibalization
removals per 100 flight hours for "both the P-14A and S-3A
aircraft
.
In the case of the P-14A aircraft a regression analysis
of cannibalization removals, Y, per flight hour, X, by fleets
provides a coefficient of determination of .830, a t-statistic
of 6.98 and a regression equation of Y = -5^.19 + 0.648X
for NAP. The NAL fleet has a regression equation of Y = 75.02
+ 0.385X with a ,55& coefficient of determination and a
t-statistic of 3.53.
A least squares regression analysis of the S-3A
aircraft provides the following results. The NAP S-3A squad-
rons produce a regression equation of Y = -52.89 +.4-00X with
a t-statistic of 17.67 and a coefficient of determination
of .969» while the NAL S-3A squadrons yield a regression
equation of Y = 133.88 + .317X with a t-statistic of 5.40
and a coefficient of determination of .7^5- Figures 27 and
28 plot the F-14A and S-3A regression analysis data.
Both regression analyses indicate that NAP canniba-
lization is significantly more flight hour dependent than
NAL cannibalization.
Why flight hours is a much more significant factor
in NAP than in NAL must be answered before any major canniba-
lization policy can be made and this will be dealt with in
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2. Cannibalization Removals to Total Maintenance Removals
The next major cannibalization methodology to be
explored as it relates to "both fleets is cannibalization
removals to total maintenance removals. Figures 29 and
30 illustrate this methodology for both fleets using the
F-14A and S-3A aircraft over the time spand of the data.
A least squares regression analysis of cannibalization
removals, Y, to total maintenance removals, X, for the NAP
F-14A squadrons provides a regression equation of Y = -381.3
+ .449X, with a t-statistic of 12.40 and a coefficient of
determination of .938. The NAL P-14A regression equation is
Y = 344.9 + .223X, with a coefficient of determination of .489
and a t-statistic of 3.09. Using the S-3A aircraft, the NAP
regression equation was calculated to be Y = -21.9 + .375X,
with a t-statistic of 24.78 and a coefficient of determina-
tion of .983. NAL S-3A squadrons provided a regression
equation of Y = 20.73 + .356X, with a coefficient of deter-
mination of .905 and a t-statistic of 9.81. Figures 31,
32 and 33, 34 display the F-14A and S-3A regression data plots
3. Cannibalization Manhours to Total Maintenance Manhours
Figures 35 and 36 display cannibalization manhours
to total maintenance manhours for the F-14A and S-3A
aircraft by fleet over the time spand of the data base.
A least squares regression analysis for NAP F-14A
aircraft yields a regression equation of Y = -1067.4
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a t-statistic of 6.46. The NAL regression equation was
calculated to be Y = 186.8 + .0429X, with a t-statistic of
4.12 and a coefficient of determination of .630. The S-3A
aircraft of NAL provided a regression equation of Y = 443.3
+ .0408X, with a t-statistic of 5-73 and a coefficient of
determination of .766. NAP S-3A aircraft produced a regres-
sion equation of Y = -341.6 + .079X, with a coefficient
of determination of .959 and a t-statistic of 15.4. Figures
37,38 and 39,40 display the F-14A and S-3A regression plot.
4. Cannibalization Removals Per Sortie
As discussed in Chapter II, cannibalization removals
per sortie present, a more realistic picture of the effects
of flight activity on cannibalization than do flight hours
alone. The number of times an aircraft starts and stops,
takes off and lands has a much greater impact on components
than the number of hours a component is running.
By performing a regression analysis on the F-14A
aircraft navywide, the coefficient of determination between
cannibalization removals and sorties was calculated to be
.827 with a t-statistic of 6.87 and a regression equation
of Y = -528.97 + .8859X.
For NAP the F-14A data provides a regression equation
of Y = -608.84 + 1.05X with a coefficient of determination
of .861 and a t-statistic of 7.87. NAL F-14A aircraft
produce a regression equation of Y = -1.69 + . 742X with a
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The NAP S-3A aircraft regression provides a regression
equation of Y =-53.21 + 1 07X and a t-statistic of 17.98
with a .970 coefficient of determination. NAL S-3A data
reveals a regression equation of Y = 39.93 + l o 003X with a
7.55 t-statistic and .851 coefficient of determination.
Figures 41 and 42 display the F-14A and S-3A regression data
plot.
5. Cannibalization Manhours Per Cannibalization Removals
The next measurement methodology to "be explored between
fleets is cannioalization manhours per cannioalization removal.
Figures 43 and 44 display the F-14A and S-3A data by fleet
for the time spand of the data base.
By performing a regression analysis of cannibalization
manhours, Y, to cannibalization removals, X, the NAP F-14A
regression equation was calculated to be Y = 1340 + 3.79X,
with a coefficient of determination of -837 and a t-statistic
of 7.14. NAL F-14A aircraft provided a regression equation
of Y = -248.9 + 3.99X, with a t-statistic of 13*93 and a
coefficient of determination of .951- The S-3A aircraft
of NAP produced a regression equation of Y = -356 + 6.36X,
with a t-statistic of 12.29 and a coefficient of determination
of .937 NAL S-3A squadrons yielded a regression equation
of Y = 311.3 + 3.20X, with a coefficient of determination
of .875 and a t-statistic of 8.40. Figures 45, 46 and
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6. Cannibalization in Terms of Equivalent Manpower
As discussed in Chapter II manpower available to
a squadron is relatively constant, "but what is done with
that manpower is not. Figures 49 and 50 illustrate F-14A
and S-3A canni"balization in terms of equivalent man-months
for each fleet.
Using the P-14A aircraft as an example, NAL expended
12.2 manyears cannibalizing compared to 19.4 manyears for
NAP between July 1979 and June 1980. Similarly, for the
S-3A aircraft NAL expended 9. 9 manyears cannibalizing com-
pared to 11.6 manyears for NAP over the same time period,
B. FLEET DICHOTOMIES
In the first section of this chapter, a cannibalization
comparison was presented between NAL and NAP using the
measurement methodologies presented in Chapter II of this
thesis . This comparison shows several significant dispari-
ties between the two fleets and leaves several very important
questions unanswered . Why is cannibalization significantly
more dependent on flight activity in NAP squadrons than in
NAL squadrons, and why are manhours as a measurement criterion
more important to NAL squadron than NAP squadrons?
Equally as important as the unanswered questions is the
overall picture that develops when all measurement
methodologies are looked at together. Of the six measurement
methodologies presented, NAP clearly has a better canniba-






























per flight hour and cannibalization removals per sortie as
criteria. NAL has a "better canniDalization profile than
NAP using canniDalization manhours to total maintenance
manhours, canniDalization manhours per canniDalization
removal, and equivalent manmonths as measurement criteria.
This leaves canniDalization removals to total maintenance
removals as the only remaining measurement methodology.
Using this methodology, NAP has a "better F-14A canniDalization
profile, but both NAP and NAL have the same profile for the
S-3A aircraft.
The only explanation for the dichotomies that exist
between fleets when measuring cannibalization is that there
are different reasons for cannibalization in action. Chapter
III of this thesis explained the reasons for cannibalization.
Those reasons for cannibalization will now be explained as
they relate to each fleet and should explain why these fleets
with the same aircraft, on the same type of ship, operating
under the same Naval Aviation Maintenance Program, have such
a significant difference in cannibalization profiles.
2. NAL vs NAP
Before attempting to explain the major differences
in cannibalization profiles that exist between NAL and NAP
an overall picture of fleet cannibalization and flight
activity must be presented. Tables I and II for the F-14-A
and S-3A aircraft will be utilized in an effort to present





July 79 - June 80
NAL NAP
Flight Hours 22023 27357
Sorties 134-82 17653
Cannibalization Removals 9989 11244
Canni"balization Manhours 36915 58731
Average NMCS Rate ±9 .1$ 22.2$
Canni"balization Removals Per Flight Hour
NAVY Y = -273.22 + .4963X r2 = .769 t = 5.76
NAL Y = 75-02 + .385X r2 = .556 t = 3.53
NAP Y = -54.19 + .648X r2 = .830 t = 6.98
MEAN NAL 45.3
MEAN NAP 41.1
Cannibalization Removals to Total Maintenance Removals
NAVY Y = -379.6 + .406X r2 = .949 t - 13.64
NAL Y = 344.9 + .223X r2 = .489 t = 3.04
NAP Y = -381.3 + .449X r2 = .938 t = 12.40
MEAN NAL 38$
MEAN NAP 32#
Cannibalization Manhours to Total Maintenance Manhours
NAVY Y = -915.5 + .0538X r2 = .923 t = 10.94
NAL Y = 186.8 + .0429X r2 = .630 t = 4.12
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NAP X = -1067.4 + .0608X r2 = .807 t = 6 46
MEAN NAL 4.5?£
MEAN NAP 5.0%
Canni"balization Removals Per Sortie
NAVY Y = -528.97 + .8859X r2 = .825 t = 6.87
NAL Y = -1.69 + .742X r2 = .685 t = 4.66
NAP Y = -608.84 + 1.05X r2 = .861 t = 7.87
MEAN NAL .74
MEAN NAP .63
Cannibalization Manhours Per Canni"balization Removal
NAVY Y = 2025.4 + 3.30X r2 = 8.41 t = 7.29
NAL Y = -248.9 + 3.99X r2 = .951 t = 13.93











July 79 - June 80
NAL NAP
Flight Hours 20576 17430
Sorties 7689 6521
Cannibalization Removals 8193 6353
Cannibalization Manhours 29982 25188
Average NMCS Rate 31. 9$ 25
.
9%
Cannibalization Removals Per Flight Hours
NAVY Y =
-56.59 + .364X r2 = .824 t = 6.84
NAL Y = 133.58 + .317X r2 = .745 t = 5.40
NAP Y = -52.89 + .400X r2 = .969 t = 17.67
MEAN NAL 39-8
MEAN NAP 36.4
Cannibalization Removals to Total Maintenance Removals
NAVY Y = -61.47 + .383X r2 = .937 t = 12.19
NAL Y = 20.73 + .356X r2 = .905 t = 9.81
NAP Y = -21.9 + .375X r2 = .983 t = 24.78
MEAN NAL 36$
MEAN NAP 36%
Cannibalization Manhours to Total Maintenance Manhours
NAVY Y = -747.7 + .0675X r2 = .880 t = 8.56
NAL Y = 443.3 + .0408X r2 = .166 t = 5-73





Cannibalization Removals Per Sortie
NAVY Y = -76.88 + 1.08X r2 = .903 t = 9=64
NAL Y = 39.93 + 1.003X r2 = .851 t = 1 .55
NAP Y = -53.21 + lo07X r2 = .970 t = 17.98
MEAN NAL 1.06
MEAN NAP .97
Cannibalization Manhours Per Cannibalization Removal
NAVY Y = -647.5 + 5.08X r2 = .737 t = 5-29
NAL Y = 3H.3 + 3.20X r2 = .875 t = 8.40









For both the F-14A and S-3A aircraft, the fleet that had the
most flight activity (flight hours, sorties) also had the
most cannibalization activity. In the case of the F-14A
aircraft NAP flew 533^ more flight hours than NAL and canniba-
lized 1255 more components. The S-3A aircraft of NAL outflew
NAP S-3A aircraft by 314-6 flight hours and cannibalized 1168
more components.
Flight activity by fleet may explain why one fleet
cannibalized more components but does not explain why canni-
balization per flight activity is so different. In the case
of both aircraft, NAP cannibalization when measured against
flight activity was always lower than NAL. This observa-
tion suggests that NAL must cannibalize for different reasons
than NAP.
Chapter III of this thesis presented seven reasons
why squadrons cannibalize. They are operational commit-
ments, material shortages, supply response time, readiness
reaching, risk avoidance, troubleshooting a complex air-
craft, and maintainability of design. Because both fleets
fly the same aircraft, maintainability and troubleshooting
a complex aircraft can be discounted as reasons for different
cannibalization profiles. Readiness between fleets has
always been so close to the same that it too can be discounted
from the picture. (Readiness figures have been omitted from
this thesis to keep it unclassified) . This leaves operational
commitments, material shortages, supply response time and
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risk avoidance as the only reasons left to explain the fleet
dichotomies. By examining Tables I and II for the F-14A
and S-3A aircraft it "becomes apparent that there is
a large disparity in canni"balization removals per flight
hour "between NAL and NAP.
In the case of NAP and the F-14A aircraft, the regres-
sion data for cannibalization removals per flight hour indicates
that 83.0$ of the monthly variance in cannibalization removals
is explained "by flight hours for NAL only 55.6% of the monthly
variance in cannibalization removals is explained by flight
hours. Using the S-3A aircraft gives much the same results.
NAP S-3A aircraft indicate that 96.6% of the monthly variance
in cannibalization removals is explained by flight hours where
as NAL S-3A aircraft only explained 7^.5% percent of monthly
cannibalization removal variance with flight hours.
Both regression analyses indicate that NAP cannibali-
zation is significantly more flight hour dependent that NAL
cannibalization, but what is driving this difference?
Chapter III of this thesis concluded that material
shortages and cannibalization activity have little or no
relationship, but a higher material shortage rate will create
more risk of a stockout and may drive a squadron to cannibalize
to avoid risk. In the case of both aircraft the fleet with
the most cannibalization removals also has the highest
average NMCS rate. Both fleets may be cannibalizing to
minimize risk, but the small difference in NMCS rate does not
appear to explain the significant differences in cannibali-
zation removals per flight hour.
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The only reason for cannibalization remaining to
explain the different cannibalization profiles is supply
response time. Table III lists the top ten F-14A navywide
cannibalized components "by fleet and average supply response
time from July 1979 to June 1980
.
From this table, it is apparent that NAL drives the
navywide top ten cannibalization list for the F-14A. In
every case, NAL has many more cannibalization removals than
NAP. Even more significant is the fact that the average
supply response time for NAL is immensely longer than the
average supply response time for NAP. This data supports the
conclusion that NAL cannibalizes due to supply response time
delays much more than NAP in the case of the F-14A. (S-3A
data of this detail was not available)
The top ten navywide cannibalization removal list
accounts for 25.8% of all NAL cannibalization, 13-5% of all
NAP cannibalization and almost 20% of all F-14A canniba-
lization. NAL's top ten cannibalized F-14A items total 2586
while NAP's top ten list is only 1526. The difference
between NAL and NAP is 1059 items. This difference between
NAL and NAP, on the top ten items list alone, explains most
of the difference in the mean rate between NAL and NAP when
measuring cannibalization in terms of flight activity. For
example, if NAL were to reduce its cannibalization by 1059
items (the difference between NAL and NAP on the top ten
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mean) .74 .66 .63
Cannioalization Removals to
Total Maintenance Removals
(yearly mean) 38% 32% 32%
This new profile explains the flight activity dichotomies
that exist "between NAL and NAP, as well as the dichotomy that
exists "between NAL and NAP when measuring cannioalization
removals to total maintenance removals. Considering the new
figures for NAL that occur, if NAL reduced cannioalization
"by the difference between NAL and NAP on the top ten item
list all measurement criteria in Table IV become almost
identical. This suggests that NAL cannibalizes to minimize
supply response time delays.
This difference in supply response time between NAL
and NAP on the top ten cannibalized item list may also





All of the top ten F-14A cannibalized items are very
easy to cannibalize in that they require very few manhours
per component to cannibalize . By examining cannibalization
manhours to total maintenance manhours, cannibalization man-
hours per cannibalization removal and canni'balization manyears
in Table I and II, it "becomes apparent that in the case of
both the F-14A and S-3A aircraft NAL has a much better can-
nibalization profile than NAP using manhour methodologies.
By cannibalizing items that require very few manhours per
component to cannibalize, NAL develops a cannibalization
profile where cannibalization manhours as a measurement
criterion, shows that NAL expends less manhours in an absolute
and percentage sense cannibalizing.
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V. SHOULD MAJOR POLICY MAKERS WORRY ABOUT CANNIBALIZATION?
A. INTRODUCTION
Cannibalization is simply an expression of a failure some-
where in the logistic system. What causes that failure or
how much it costs to fix the failure is what major policy
makers should worry about, not the fact that a component
was cannibalized from one aircraft to another. In this
chapter, canni'balization as it relates to the logistic system
will "be explained in an effort to determine if canni'balization
is an evil maintenance practice to "be avoided at any cost or
if canni'balization is a viable logistic alternative.
B. COST OF CANNIBALIZATION
Chapter II of this thesis pointed out that the entire
U.S. Navy spent 53.12 manyears cannibalizing the F-14A and
S-3A aircraft between July 1979 and June 198O.
By dividing 53.12 by the number of F-14A and S-3A
squadrons (28) an average of 1.89 manyears per squadron was
spent cannibalizing. The question that must be answered is,
are the 1.89 manyears per squadron spent cannibalizing in
excess of total maintenance manyears available to a P-14A
or S-3A squadron or do the F-14A and S-3A squadrons not
use all available manyears to begin with?
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By dividing the 53.12 manyears into its "basic components,
a much different view of the cost of cannihalization in terms
of manyears developes . For example, the S-3A aircraft spent
21.5 manyears cannibalizing 14,596 components. This means
that oecause there are 12 S-3A squadrons, the average squadron
spent 1.79 manyears canniDalizing.
The F-14A aircraft presents much the same picture. All
navy F-14A c armrealization was 31.62 manyears for the period
of July 1979 to June 1980 (this equates to 1.97 manyears
per squadron spent canniDalizing) . Of the 16 F-14A squadrons
14 are seagoing and two are replacement training squadrons.
A seagoing F-14A squadron has allowance for 168 organizational
level maintenance technicians. With the typical 80$ manning
that is present navywide, this equates to 134 maintenance
personnel per squadron. One hundred and thirty four men per
squadron times 14 squadrons equates to 1876 manyears of
maintenance for the seagoing squadrons. All recorded
maintenance on the F-14A, including the two training squadron
manyears, only equates to 650 manyears documented "between
July 1979 and June 1980. Clearly, 31.62 manyears is very
insignificant when compared against 1226 manyears available
for maintenance that is not utilized. F-14A and S-3A can-
nioalization does not cost extra manyears. It is merely
work that can easily "be handled "by existing manpower.
Where manyears may have an impact on a squadron is at the
workcenter level. If one workcenter is doing most of the
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cannibalization then canni"balization may indeed have an adverse
impact on workcenter manpower. For example, if one work-
center accounts for the majority of canni'balization in a
squadron, there may well "be a manpower cost associated with
cannibalization. In the case of F-14A aircraft for example,
seven of the top ten navywide cannioalization list components
"belong to one workcenter. This workcenter could very possibly
be working more manyears than available by working normal
time
.
C. ALTERNATIVES TO CANNIBALIZATION
Cannibalization delivers to the maintenance manager a
timely component that is ready for flight with a minimum
amount of effort. Cannibalization discounts logistic system
failures and allows the maintenance manager to work in an
environment of low risk. Cannibalization can maximize
readiness, help meet most, if not all, operational commit-
ments placed on a squadron and discounts supply response
time delay problems. In fact, cannibalization allows air-
craft that have maintainability design features to utilize
those engineered features to their fullest extent possible
by not waiting for a one hour supply response time delay.
The only alternative to cannibalization, if readiness
and operational commitments remain the same, is a logistic
system that works with much better accuracy than is now
present. The only problem is that to fix the logistic system
to the point where cannibalization is reduced by 20% may
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cost so much more than cannibalization does that from a
cost-benefit standpoint it would "be like throwing money away.
If the average manyear of labor cost as much as $100, 000 . 00
then a 20$ reduction in cannibalization "by all F-14A and
S-3A squadrons would only equate to 1.06 million dollars
saved. Using an P-14A squadron as an example, 1.97 manyears
times $100,000.00 times 20% is only $39,^-00.00.
If this savings of $39,4-00.00 is spent to reduce risk
of stockout by buying more spare parts or improving supply
response delays it is not going to buy very much.
Thus, from a cost standpoint, cannibalization is much
cheaper than a new logistic system. The only alternatives
are to fix all logistic reasons for cannibalization or pro-
cure an aircraft that is 100 percent reliable so that a




This thesis presented an analysis of cannibalization
as it affects the F-14A and S-3A aircraft navywide and "by
major type commander. The objectives of this thesis were
to present canni'balization measurement methodologies, why
squadrons cannibalize, a comparison by major fleets and to
determine if cannibalization is in fact a viable logistic
alternative
.
From this analysis of cannibalization it was learned
that cannibalization is clearly a function of flight activity.
In fact, 76.9$ of the monthly F-14A and 82.4$ of the monthly
S-3A cannibalization variance is caused by the monthly
variation in flight hours. It was shown that the number
of sorties or flights by a given type aircraft is a much
better predictor of cannibalization activity than the number
of flight hours on an aircraft. Sortie activity accounts
for 82.5$ of the F-14A and 90.3$ of the S-3A monthly
variance in cannibalization removals. Clearly, if one
has to measure cannibalization in terms of flight activity,
cannibalization removals per sortie is the best measure.
The analysis of why squadrons cannibalize pointed out
that one could be 100$ effective at meeting NMCS goals, and
not even dent the amount of cannibalization that takes place.
However, cannibalization is an expression of a failure
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somewhere in the logistic system. The high tempo of carrier
operations that requires maintenance managers and technicians
to repair a returning aircraft in less than 30 minutes with
an aircraft that was designed for component removal and
replacement in less than 15 minutes, and a logistic support
system "based on a one-hour supply response time is where the
problem "begins. Clearly, if cannibalization is to "be
reduced "by 20%, the highest payoff potential is in reduced
supply response time.
The single "biggest lesson to "be learned from this analysis
of cannibalization is the fact that the act of cannibalizing
a component is not "bad, but the double maintenance manhours
that occurs is. We ask our maintenance technicians to
expend double manhours because as maintenance and logistic
managers we cannot make the logistic system serve us properly.
Thus, the 20% reduction called for by the Chief of Naval
Operations should be in manhours.
Cannibalization should be utilized, but tempered with
sound common sense until the logistic system problems that
created it can be corrected. However, the cost of fixing
the logistic system failures may far exceed the cost of
the manyears spent cannibalizing now.
If a manyear of labor cost the U.S. Navy as much as
$100,000.00, then the total annual cost of all F-14A and S-3A
cannibalization would only be 5«3 million dollars. This
amount of money would not do much to help fix a logistic
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system problem when you could only "buy two or three spare
components per aircraft carrier "before your money ran out.
However, it may make a big dent in the supply response time
problem if it were spent on computers to speed up the manual
issue of replacement components.
A 20% reduction as called for by the Chief of Naval
Operations would reduce the dollars available to help fix
the logistic system from 5*3 million to 1.06 million.
Clearly, 1.06 million dollars would do very little in helping
28 squadrons reduce cannibalization.
Cannibalization should and can be minimized and some
reduction is a sound achievable goal. But, why 20$? Why
not 15% or 25%? What is so magic about a 20% reduction?
This reduction should be in manhours, not items cannibalized.
With this in mind, the author recommends the following actions:
1„ Measure cannibalization in terms of manhours.
2. If cannibalization must be measured in terms of flight
activity, use sorties rather than flight hours.
3. Make supply response time instead of not mission
capable supply rates (NMCS) the primary measure of supply
effectiveness.
4. Expend resources reducing supply response time delays
rather than increasing stock levels by:
a. Reducing the naval aviation maintenance program
supply response time standard to 15 minutes, so engineered




b. Relocate as many high demand, easy to remove and
replace components as space allows to the flight deck to
reduce issue delay time;
c. Automate the DD-134-8 and Technical Research
Sections of the Supply Response Center to allow for decreased
paper work time on material issues;
d. Rearrange aircraft carrier store rooms so com-
ponents that meet the maintainability design criterion of
15 minutes to remove and replace are stored to minimize their
distance from point of demand.
5. Temper any cannibalization monitoring program with
sound common sense. Remember it is the acquisition and policy
setting process that gives maintenance managers, supply
officers and naval aviators an aircraft to repair in thirty
minutes with a supply system "based on one-hour response time
and an aircraft designed which has components which can be




1. Chief of Naval Operations Messages 292128Z Aug 78 &
14-2014Z May 79 C arm realization Reduction Program .
2. Naval Aviation Maintenance Support Office Report
4790.A8855-01. C arm realization Analysis Summary ,
July 1979 through June 1980.
3
.
Naval Aviation Maintenance Support Office Report
4790.A7958-01, 3M Aviation SCIR/Utilization/
Maintenance History # Scrubbed # , July 1979 through
June 1980. ~ "
4. OPNAVINST 4790. 2B, The Naval Aviation Maintenance





1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandriz, Virginia 22314
2. Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange 1
U.S. Army Logistics Management Center
Fort Lee, Virginia 23807
^3. Library, Code 0142 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 939^0
4. Department Chairman, Code 54 Js 1
Department of Administrative Science
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
5. Professor Dan C. Boger Code 54Bk 2
Department of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
6. Professor A. W. McMasters, Code 54Mg 5
Department of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
7. Commander Naval Air Force U.S. Atlantic Fleet
Code 53 2
Norfolk, Virginia 235H
8. Lt K.M. Myette, USN, Code 533 3











c.l Cannibal ization of
the F-14A and S-3A
ai rcraft : a viable lo-
gistic alternative.
lhesM9975
Cannibalization of the F-14A and S-3A ai
3 2768 001 92607 4
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
:
-
:
•••''-
:
'"•'<'
I I \v^H
will
>',>''ii"'.,
KBWBW
IH0BFHI
>;?>»!
MiW- roam
'
'
' I V
oomABL
WMM
